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En este trabajo estudiamos la dinámica diaria de la tasa interbancaria en Chile, con especial 
atención al rol de la liquidez provista a través de depósitos bancarios y operaciones de mercado 
abierto realizadas por el Banco Central. El principal objetivo de este trabajo es evaluar la 
información contenida en datos desagregados y de alta frecuencia de esas variables. Los 
principales resultados se encuentran relacionados a la significancia económica de la velocidad 
de convergencia, los efectos calendario y de las operaciones con pacto de retroventa (repo). El 
Banco Central juega un rol más importante drenando que inyectando liquidez por medio de 
operaciones monetarias discrecionales. Sin embargo, no hay asimetrías en términos de la 
efectividad de las inyecciones y drenajes discrecionales dependiendo de la liquidez del 
mercado. Adicionalmente, los bancos de mayor tamaño son menos receptivos a las operaciones 
monetarias, mientras que los bancos pequeños son los más sensibles a dichas operaciones, lo 
cual es consistente con el tradicional rol de estas categorías de bancos en la provisión de 
liquidez en el mercado interbancario. Finalmente, los depositantes privados no juegan un rol 






In this paper we study the dynamics of the interbank rate in Chile, with special attention to the 
role of liquidity provided by private depositors and by the central bank’s open market 
operations on a daily basis. The main aim of this paper is the use of disaggregated and high 
frequency data on such variables. The most relevant findings are related to the statistical and 
economic significance of speed of convergence, calendar effects and repos operations. The 
Central Bank plays a more important role injecting than draining liquidity through discretionary 
operations. However, there are not asymmetries in terms of the effectiveness of the 
discretionary injections and drainages operations depending on the liquidity market status.  In 
terms of effect by class of bank, large- and medium-size banks are less receptive to monetary 
operations; by contrast small-size banks are the most responsive, which is consistent with its 
traditional position as a liquidity demander. Finally, private deposits do not play an important 
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1. Introduction 
The interbank money market rate (ir) stands at the shortest end of the yield 
curve, and is the operational target for the monetary policy rate (mpr). 
Therefore, understanding the factors behind the dynamics of the ir is relevant 
not only for participants in the interbank market, but also for private investors 
and monetary authorities. The ir is a key benchmark for interest rates in the 
short-term money market and its movements may have effects on the whole 
term structure (Taylor and Williams, 2008 among others). Moreover, the 
interbank market represents the first stage of the monetary transmission 
channel, where monetary policy actions first come into contact with the rest of 
the financial system. Indeed, an effective monetary policy requires that the 
overnight interest rate remains “at an average of around” the mpr. 
In this paper we study the dynamics of the ir in Chile, giving special 
attention to the role of the liquidity provided by private depositors and by the 
Central Bank’s open market operations.
1  Our paper extends the previous 
literature mainly in three aspects. Firstly, we study the effect of liquidity 
provision by both the central bank and private depositors on the dynamics of 
the ir. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt in the 
literature to broadly incorporate this dimension into the analysis of the ir. 
Secondly, we provide novel evidence on the behavior of the ir in an emerging 
economy, which is useful to fill the gap created by preceding literature mainly 
focusing on industrial countries.
2 Finally, we take a systematic approach that 
involves both the time series and panel data dimensions, allowing us to have a 
broader picture of the factors behind the high frequency dynamics of the ir.  
The market liquidity affects directly the amount of resources that 
commercial banks have at their disposal and which they will consequently be 
willing to lend in the interbank market. Theoretical literature has developed 
models along these lines, analyzing the functioning of the interbank market 
using a general framework in which banks’ reserve positions are affected by 
random liquidity shocks and where the interbank market allows banks to fulfill 
                                                 
1 The functioning of the Chilean interbank market is similar in structure to US and Euro area cases. Appendix 1 
describes in depth technical details related to the functioning of the interbank market in Chile. 
2 Evidence for the European overnight interbank rate (EONIA) and for the federal funds rate can be found in Spindt 
and Homeister (1988), Hamilton (1996), Balduzzi et al. (1997, 1998), Gaspar (2004), Nautz and Offermanns (2006), 
Prati et al. (2003) and Cocco et al. (2009), among others.   2 
their liquidity requirements (e.g., Ho and Saunders, 1985; Freixas et al, 2000; 
Allen and Gale, 2000). However, with the exceptions of Wurtz (2004) and 
Hamilton (1996),
3 empirical studies do not fully consider the effect of daily 
liquidity conditions on the analysis of the ir.
4  
The database we use in this paper contains detailed information about the 
different types of open market operations as well as deposits by depositors at 
the bank level. This information allows us to test the role of liquidity provision 
by the central bank and private depositors on the interbank market.
5 In this line 
of research, Nautz and Offermanns (2006) explore the role of the repo auction 
format in the Euro overnight interbank rate (EONIA), and Prati et al. (2003) 
study the effect of central banks’ operating procedures and intervention styles 
for G-7 countries.  
The modeling strategy for the time series estimation follows Sarno and 
Thornton (2001), and Nautz and Offermanns (2006), who employ an error 
correction model to characterize the dynamics of the ir allowing for non-
linearities.
6 Given that we have high frequency data of the monetary policy 
operations and deposits at banks, we complement the strategies of these studies 
by evaluating the economic impact of different types of interventions on the 
short run dynamics. We also evaluate whether deposits from pension funds (PF 
hereafter) have a different impact on the ir from that of the others depositors. 
We supplement time series estimations with panel data analysis that exploits 
the variation of the ir across banks. The estimation strategy is a standard fixed 
effect panel using instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity of 
some regressors. 
                                                 
3 These authors consider the daily reserve surplus, i.e. current account holdings minus reserve requirements, as an 
indicator of the liquidity condition. 
4 Most of the empirical literature explains the dynamic of the interbank rate assessing the effect of periodic events 
affecting banks’ reserve positions. Available evidence points out that variables like the last day of the reserve 
maintenance period, the last day of the month, the prior day to a holyday or the day of the monetary policy meeting are 
relevant for explaining the daily dynamics of the ir (Hamilton, 1996; Sarno and Thornton, 2001; Prati et al., 2003; 
Moschitz, 2004; Nautz and Offermans, 2006; Benito et al., 2007). 
5 Liquidity provision by the central bank usually involves drainage and injection of funds through repo operations at the 
mpr (discretionary operations hereafter), combined with permanent draining and injection of funds at mpr – 25 bps and 
mpr + 25 bps, the “floor” and “ceiling” of market rates around the target, respectively. The use of discretionary 
operations, instead of credit facilities, could be interpreted as a high degree of commitment of the central bank to take 
the ir close to the mpr, which could lead to the gap between these rates being closed faster. 
6 Benito et al. (2007) follow a more statistical approach to model the EONIA. They employ several models containing 
jump components – for instance ARCH-Poisson-Gaussian process.   3 
Our results indicate that the ir and the mpr move together very closely and, 
when these variables deviate from each other, the speed of convergence is 
around 30% per day. In term of the explanatory variables, the calendar effects 
and open market operations –especially the discretionary operations- are the 
most relevant in explaining the dynamics of the ir. With respect to the calendar 
effects, they play an important role on the dynamics of the ir –which is 
consistent with previous findings in this area- a situation that poses questions 
on which frictions drive this finding. Regarding the relevance of market liquidity 
provided by the central bank, we find that the central bank played an 
important role during the sample period, while private depositors do not help to 
significantly improve the explanation of the dynamics of the ir.  For example, if 
we consider the average daily monetary operation and long-run PF’s deposits, 
the effect of discretionary injections, drainages and long-run PF’s deposits on 
the ir is 1.7, 3.4, and 0.05 bps, respectively. The permanent credit lines are not 
statistically significant; this situation could be due to the fact that this 
instrument is available on a daily frequency and, therefore, the market has 
internalized its operation in the valuation of the ir. The results also show a 
more active role of central bank injecting than draining liquidity. The effects of 
drainages and injection operations on the ir are quite similar, but the magnitude 
of drainages is close to two time the injections. At the bank level, the most 
relevant asymmetry is due to the distinction of banks according to their size. 
Concretely, the large banks are less sensitive to monetary operations –which 
could be associated to their condition of liquidity providers- meanwhile small-
size banks are the most responsive to central bank’s instruments. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data. 
Section 3 performs time and panel data estimations. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Data 
2.1.  Description 
In this paper we use three datasets. The first consists of detailed information 
for each loan granted in the Chilean interbank market on a daily basis for the 
period of June 2006 to August 2008 (532 trading days). The data is from the   4 
Central Bank of Chile
7 and include 29 banks that are active traders in the 
money market. It also identifies lenders and borrowers, as well as the interest 
rate and volume involved in each operation.  
With the previous information, we compute the daily ir at which banks 
borrow from each other as the weighted average of its operations for each day. 
Similarly, we construct the aggregated ir as the weighted average of the 
individual  ir, where the weights are computed as the ratio of the volume 
involved in each operation to the aggregated traded volume. 
The other two datasets contain information with proxies of the liquidity 
conditions at the banking system. The first dataset comprises daily information 
of the operations carried out by each bank with the Central Bank of Chile (i.e., 
repos, auctions of promissory notes, etc.). The second dataset contains 
information on deposits in commercial banks grouped by PF and other 
investors. This dataset was built with information provided by the 
Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (SBIF) and the 
Superintendencia de Pensiones (SP). 
We consider several other sources of information for external and domestic 
variables that we include in the analysis as factors that could potentially affect 
the aggregated liquidity conditions. On the external side, we use the Libor-OIS 
spread and the VIX. On the domestic side, we consider a measure for shocks on 
the expected mpr, corresponding to the difference between the expected mpr 
derived from forward contracts and the current mpr. 
 
2.2.  The Interbank Rate and the Overnight Money Market 
Within the sample period, the ir has followed the policy rate closely, 
generally being only 1.8 bps above the mpr (see Figure 1a). In this dimension, 
the Central Bank has been successful in steering the short-term interest rates 
towards the mpr, in spite of the large variations of the mpr during the sample 
period—from 5.00 to 8.25 percent and the financial turbulences derived from the 
sub-prime crisis. Indeed, there are only a few episodes where the ir decouples 
significantly from the mpr and these episodes have been highly transitory (for 
instance, mid-2007 —see Figure 1b). Nonetheless, there is considerable 
                                                 
7 The functioning of the Chilean interbank market is similar in structure to U.S. and European area cases. Appendix 1 
describes in depth the technical details related to the functioning of the interbank market in Chile.   5 
heterogeneity of these variables across time. In fact, the average deviation 
during 2007 was close to 5 bps which contrasts with the 0.5 bps observed during 
years 2006 and 2008 (Table 1). And, in terms of volume in the interbank 
market, its peak in the sample occurred in 2007 (30% and 15% higher with 
respect to 2006 and 2008, respectively), which suggests a high appetite for 
liquidity coming from commercial banks at the beginning of the financial 
turbulences derived from the sub-prime crisis.  
 
Figure 1 




























































































































































































































































Interbank Market’s Descriptive Statistics (2006-2008) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005-2008
ir  (%) 3.91 5.02 5.35 6.72 5.61
ir - mpr  (bps) 0.8 0.5 4.8 -0.5 1.8
Average Volume  262.8 256.7 333.5 290.9 294.8
Note: Interbank rate is expressed in percent points, the difference between the interbank and the target 
rate in basis points. Average interbank volume is in billions pesos.
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on information provided by the Central Bank of Chile. 
   6 
In the mentioned decoupling of mid-2007 (see Panel b, Figure 1), for almost 
an entire month the ir was systematically above the mpr, with a spread that 
reached a peak of 21 bps at the beginning of September 2007. This decoupling 
could be related to different drivers happening simultaneously, making the 
identification of the incidence of these factors an extremely difficult task. First, 
the Chilean and international financial markets were severely hit by turbulences 
derived from the sub-prime crisis.
8 Second, on August 9
th the maximum 
regulatory limit on foreign assets held by PF was increased from 30 to 35 
percent of the total portfolio.
9 Finally, there were high expectations of an 
increase of the mpr on the monetary policy meeting of September 13
th of that 
year and commercial banks seemed to anticipate a 25 bps increase in that 
meeting. 
On the quantity side, Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the open 
market operations during the sample period. A few points deserve to be 
mentioned. First, the average interbank operations are of similar magnitude to 
most of the monetary operations managed by the Central Bank.
10 Second, the 
sample period considers the significant activity of both liquidity and draining 
discretionary operations, which will allow us to identify if the market responds 
differently to these operations. Third, if we compare the frequency of liquidity 
and drainages with the ir-mpr spread, it is not evident that discretionary or 
permanent operations work in a counter-cyclical fashion with respect to degree 
of decoupling of the ir –i.e., injections (drainages) relatively more important 
when the ir is above (below) the mpr. In this sense, the frequency of injections 
or drainages of liquidity does not seem to depend only upon the ir running 
above or below the mpr. This could suggest that market liquidity condition is 
not only measured by the ir – mpr spread. We take this situation into account 
in our econometric estimations by using several controls. However, and just for 
expositional purposes, we define a market as liquid when the ir<mpr and vice 
versa. 
 
                                                 
8 Indeed, during August 2007 the Chilean stock market experienced a phase of unusual high volatility, falling almost 
10% between the 9
th and the 13
th of August and fully recovering these losses in the following four trading days. 
9 It was common in this period to observe Chilean money managers declaring in the current press, the possibility that 
pension funds could be affecting market liquidity. PF accounts on average around 20% of total deposits held by 
commercial banks.  
10 The average of each type of operation is calculated using only the days that register each type of operation.   7 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Interbank Market (2006-2008) 
Average Operation Volume (in billions pesos)
Variable Mean Median Maximum
Interbank Operations 288.6 286.2 658.6
Discretional Injections 297.0 242.9 1,202.5
Discretional Draining 600.5 545.6 1,397.2
Permanent Liquidity Facilities 47.5 21.9 513.7





Share of the Time with Positive Op Overall ( ir  > mpr  )(  ir <  mpr  )
Interbank Operations 100% 100% 100%
Injections 22% 25% 15%
Draining 6% 7% 5%
Permanent Liquidity Facilities 88% 89% 91%
Permament Deposits Facilities 100% 100% 100%
Note: Discretional Operations excludes swap operations. The average only consider days with positive operations
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on information provided by the Central Bank of Chile. 
 
 
2.3.  Bank-Level information 
The aggregate information allows us to understand global and domestic 
factors behind the dynamics of the average ir, but it hides the heterogeneity of 
the liquidity needs of each commercial bank. For this reason, we also explore 
the cross-section dimension of the data to determine whether the adjustment of 
the ir depends on specific characteristics of each bank. 
To illustrate the degree of heterogeneity of the ir at the bank level, Figure 2 
contains the aggregate ir – mpr spread (left panel) and the spread for each bank 
(right panel) from June 2006 to October 2008. It is interesting to notice that the 
ir exhibits significant variation across banks, covering practically all the range 
of +/-25 bps, with a few exceptions where the spread exceeds the ceiling of +25 
bps during 2007, while the opposite occurs at the end of the sample period.  
   8 
 
Figure 2 
Interbank Rate - Monetary Policy Rate Spread 
Panel (a) 






































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on information provided by the Central Bank of Chile. 
 
 
In order to shed some light on this heterogeneity, Table 3 presents interbank 
market information for large-, medium- and small-size banks.
11 Three facts 
emerge: a) the medium- and small-scale banks exhibit an asking ir 
approximately two times larger than large banks -1.4 vs. 3.3 and 2.5 bps, 
respectively;
12 b) the larger-banks  are willing to lend to a lower ir (2.8 bps) 
than medium- (3.5 bps) and small-banks (4.0 bps); and c) the size of the loans 
as percentage of assets is quite higher in small-scale banks (2.0%) than in large- 
and medium-size banks -0.2% and 0.6%, respectively. These findings suggest 
that different class of banks participate in the interbank market for different 
purposes, while larger tend to use the interbank market to drain liquidity, the 
medium-scale participate to obtain liquidity. 
 
                                                 
11 These categories of banks are the most relevant in the Chilean banking system both in terms of assets and number. 
More importantly, for our study, they explain more than 70% of the interbank market activity. 
12 One possible explanation for the lower asking ir of large-scale banks is that these banks are able to finance their 
reserve needs at a lower cost. To verify if large banks have higher funding costs than medium-scale banks, we build a 
measure of funding costs as the ratio of monthly interest payment to total liabilities of each bank relative to the average 
banking system. Values higher than one of this measure reflect funding cost higher than the average. On the contrary, 
values lower than one reflects cheaper funding cost than the banking system. The results show that large-scale bank are 
able to obtain funding almost 1.2 percent cheaper than the average bank, while medium-scale banks have an average 
funding cost 3.5 percent higher than the average.   9 
 
Table 3 
Interbank Market Statistics 









Average Asking Spread (bps) 1,4 3,3 2,5 2,9
Average Lending Spread (bps) 2,8 3,5 4,0 2,9
Average daily Interbank Asking Volume* 25,8 14,1 5,4 10,5
% of Assets 0,2% 0,5% 2,0% 0,4%
% of Financial Investment 1,7% 6,4% 8,8% 3,4%
Average daily Interbank Loans Volume* 37,4 9,7 4,7 10,5
% of Assets 0,3% 0,4% 1,7% 0,4%
% of Financial Investment 2,5% 4,4% 7,6% 3,4%
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on information provided by the Central Bank of Chile. 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we present time series and panel estimations to disentangle 
the main driving forces behind the dynamics of the ir, considering both global 
and individual liquidity needs. A time series approach is useful to analyze the 
role of aggregate shocks, while the panel estimation allows us to exploit the 
heterogeneity of the ir a c r o s s  b a n k s .  J o i n t l y ,  w e  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  s t u d y  t h e  
differential effect of shocks across different types of banks. 
 
3.1.  Time Series Analysis 
From a time series perspective, modeling economic variables requires 
evaluating if the series are stationary. Stationary variables and integrated series 
demand completely different modeling strategies. As Table A in Appendix 2 
shows, the ir and the mpr behave very persistently during the sample period. In 
fact, the half-life of a shock on the ir is longer than one year, while the half-life 
of the mpr is even more persistent. Part of these dynamics could be explained 
by the discrete changes in the mpr.
 13 However, in order to avoid the problem of 
                                                 
13 Testing for unit root in the mpr is challenging because this rate changes discretely and its increments are irregularly 
spaced in time. An overwhelming majority of the literature fails to reject a unit root based on the low power of unit root 
test when dealing with series that present infrequent changes (Hamilton and Jorda, 2002).    10 
spurious results, it is necessary to test the existence of unit roots.
14 We apply a 
battery of unit-root tests to both series, including the traditional Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, the Elliot et al. (1996) efficient test, denoted as DF-LS, and 
the KPSS and Phillip-Perron tests. Results successively confirm for each of 
these tests that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for 
ir and the mpr series. 
Since the ir and the mpr move closely together and sporadically deviate from 
each other (see Figure 1, panel (a)), we evaluate the presence of a long-run 
relationship between both series. Evaluating this hypothesis is equivalent to 
testing whether the residual of an OLS regression between ir and mpr is non-
stationary against the alternative that it is stationary. Results reject the null of 
unit-root for residuals, confirming the presence of a long run relationship.
15 The 
low value for the half-life of the ir-mpr spread (less than 2 trading days) seems 
to confirm the stationary nature of this variable. 
Given the non-stationary behavior of the ir and its co-integration with the 
mpr, the most natural approach is an error correction model (ECM) with the 
mpr as the long term anchor.
16 This approach is not novel in the literature. In 
fact, it has been applied by Nautz and Offermanns (2006), and Sarno and 
Thornton (2002) to model the EONIA in the Euro zone and the federal funds 
rate in United States, respectively. 
The ECM we estimate is formulated as follows:  
 
( ) 01 1 1 121´ tt t t t t ir ir mpr mpr ir X α αα δ ε −− − − Δ= − +Δ +Δ + +,    (1) 
where  t ir  is the interbank rate,  t mpr  the monetary policy rate,  X  other 
explanatory variables, and Δ the first-difference operator. The parameter  0 α  is 
the rate at which the deviations of ir from the mpr are closed each day. The 
vector of other explanatory variables, X, involves several monetary operations 
variables, regulatory capital requirements, institutional investor deposit 
variables, mpr surprises, external variables and calendar effects. 
                                                 
14 In practice, both stationary and non-stationary modeling strategies for the mpr are considered in the literature. We 
take one of the stands in the literature testing for the presence of unit root in the ir and the target rate. 
15 Table A, third column. 
16 It is worth mentioning that an error correction specification could also be obtained from a more general specification 
where the ir is just modeled as a function of its own lags, lags from the mpr plus other controls.   11 
Regarding monetary operations, we consider discretionary operations that 
provide liquidity (repos) and those that reduce it (liquidity deposits), and non 
discretionary instruments (permanent credit facilities) expressed in net terms, 
that is, liquidity injections minus drainage. It is worth mentioning that the 
distinction between discretional and permanent monetary operations matters for 
the analysis of the determinants of the ir. While the first group comprises of 
agreements on an occasional basis issued at the mpr, the second one corresponds 
to operations in which every bank is allowed to deposit (withdraw) at 25 bps 
below (above) the mpr. From a policy standpoint, to determine the effectiveness 
of discretional instruments is relevant for better fine-tuning in extraordinary 
episodes of decoupling of the ir from the mpr and. 
  Mandatory reserve requirements (also known as technical reserves) are 
included since they correspond to indirect instruments used by the Central 
Bank to drain liquidity.
17 Additionally, we consider deposits in commercial 
banks by PF and by other investors (i.e., insurance companies, mutual funds, 
households, etc.). The inclusion of PF deposits may be relevant because the 
share of its maintained deposits’ portfolio in whole deposits of the system is 
above 20 percent and, therefore, could end up influencing the ir.
18 We divide PF 
deposits into short term and long term, corresponding to less or more than 90 
days respectively. Since there is no information to classify the non-PF deposits 
by term, we only consider the aggregates.   
Other domestic variables included are monthly mpr surprises, measured as 
the difference between the effective mpr and the implicit expected rate in 
forward contracts two weeks before the monetary policy meeting. We also 
control for calendar effects through dummies extensively used in the literature: 
day of monetary policy meeting –generally the second Thursday of each month-, 
the day that banks must cover their reserve requirement –9
th of each month-, 
and the day of value-added tax payment.
19 Finally, in order to capture the 
international liquidity conditions, we consider external variables such as the 
CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) and the Libor-OIS spread. While the Libor -
Overnight interest swap spread capture the role of “liquidity contagion” coming 
                                                 
17 In Chile, banks are obligued to deposit the difference between their current liabilities and the amount equivalent to 
2.5 times their capital and reserves in an special account in the Central Bank. 
 
18 PF in Chile are important players in key asset prices. For instance, Cowan, Rappaport and Selaive (2006) provide 
evidence of the role of PF on the exchange rate. 
19 For instance, Hamilton (1996), Sarno and Thornton (2002), and Nautz and Offermanns (2006).   12 
from external markets, the VIX captures market expectations of near-term 
volatility. 
 
3.1.1.  Results 
The OLS estimations rely on the assumption that the independent variables 
are predetermined or statistically exogenous. However, it is likely that monetary 
operations could be endogenous to the dynamics of the ir. Central banks 
respond to price signals when they decide the amount they will put in the 
lending window in the form of repos. Similarly, when commercial banks choose 
to obtain funds from the interbank market over the permanent facilities 
alternative, they are implicitly responding to the relative cost of both sources of 
liquidity. Finally, given that the ir represents the shortest end of the yield 
curve, movements of this price could affect the amount of deposits in 
commercial banks.  
Following the previous reasoning, a straightforward OLS estimation could 
generate biased and inconsistent parameters. Thus, given the potential 
endogeneity of the covariates, we run the Hausman (1978) test to all variables. 
The test supports statistical exogeneity for all the variables with the exception 
of net permanent facilities. Therefore, we use Instrumental Variables (IV) 
procedure, choosing as external instruments of net permanent facilities their 
lagged levels, lagged values of the ir-mpr spread, daily dummies and dummies 
for positive and negative values of the ir-mpr spread. A similar approach using 
IV estimation has also been used recently by Cocco et al (2009). 
Table 4 presents our estimates for the short-run dynamics of the ir, which 
include up to one lagged difference of the ir and the mpr. Several findings 
deserve attention. First, the speed of convergence of the ir to the mpr is 
relatively high (0.28-0.34, approximately) indicating that approximately one-
third of the gap between these two variables is reduced in one day. This 
magnitude is near to the estimates for the Euro interbank market by Nautz and 
Offermanns (2006), who find a speed of convergence of 0.26. Second, the short-
run effect of changes in the mpr is significantly positive, but does not entail a 
one-for-one change in the ir. In fact, the estimated coefficient in all the 
specifications lies in the range 0.15-0.22, which suggests that the effect on the ir 
of a one-time change in the mpr is distributed over time. This finding is also   13 
consistent with the evidence provided by Nautz and Offermanns (2006), 
Angelini (2002) and Linzert and Schmidt (2008). 
In Col [1] of Table 4 we test some calendar effects that could potentially 
affect the liquidity position of the banks: the day of the monetary policy 
meeting (which takes the value of one for contemporaneous and following day of 
the meeting), the value-added tax payment day (which takes the value of one 
on the day of payment and on the previous day) and the preceding four days to 
the end of the maintenance period.
20 In addition, we include a dummy that 
takes the value of one in the first four days of the maintenance period in order 
to control for the higher demand because of the banks’ obligation to comply 
with at least 90% of the required reserve by the 23
rd of each month. The aim of 
this intermediate target is to encourage less volatility in the banks’ reserve 
requirement compliance and thus the ir. 
Our results suggest that the ir does not vary significantly in the final days of 
the maintenance period. On the contrary, our results show that in the days 
prior to the VAT’s payoff day and on the days surrounding the monetary policy 
meeting, the ir increases approximately 2 bps, although in the case of the 
monetary policy meeting the increase is significant only in the three last 
specifications. Similarly, in each of the first four days of the maintenance period, 
the ir increases by 3 bps. This result is robust to different specifications of the 
length of dummy variables, and as we show in columns [2] to [4] of Table 4, 
they are also robust to the inclusion of alternative sets of control variables. 
 
                                                 
20 Consistently with former theoretical models which consider monthly reserve requirements as the most important shock 
affecting banks’ liquidity position (see Ho and Saunders, 1985; Freixas et al, 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000; King, 2004 
among others), the end of maintenance period dummy variable is by far the most extensive calendar effect considered in 
the literature. See Hamilton (1996); Perez and Quiros (2002); Wurtz (2003); Prati et al. (2003) and Nautz and 
Offermanns (2006), among others.   14 
Table 4 
IV Estimations 
Dependent Variable:  t ir Δ  
May 2005 – Aug 2008 
ir  (t-1) -0.342 *** -0.299 *** -0.295 *** -0.286 ***
mpr  (t-1) 0.343 *** 0.299 *** 0.295 *** 0.286 ***
Δ mpr 0.215 ** 0.179 0.175 0.142
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.092 *** 0.032 0.026 0.031
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.230 * 0.251 ** 0.261 ** 0.223 *
Calendar Effects
MP Meeting day 0.021 0.03 ** 0.032 ** 0.034 **
VAT Payoff day 0.026 ** 0.02 * 0.018 0.015
Pre- End of Maintenance Period -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
Post- End of Maintenance Period 0.028 *** 0.03 *** 0.027 ** 0.028 **
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.057 *** -0.061 *** -0.062 ***
Δ Injections (t-1) -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
Δ Draining 0.014 0.011 0.007
Δ Draininng (t-1) 0.056 ** 0.054 ** 0.059 **
Δ Mandatory Reserve Requirement 0.011 0.015 0.011
Δ Mandatory Reserve Requirement (t-1) 0.111 ** 0.112 *** 0.116 ***
Δ Net Permanent Facilities 0.102 * 0.103 * 0.111 **
Δ Net Permanent Facilities (t-1) -0.091 -0.083 -0.095
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Other Investors' Deposits -0.008 -0.004
Δ Other Investors' Deposits (t-1) -0.006 -0.004
Δ Short-Run Pension Funds Deposits 0.091 0.093
Δ Short-Run Pension Funds Deposits (t-1) -0.112 * -0.123 *
Δ Long-Run Pension Funds Deposits 0.110 0.118
Δ Long-Run Pension Funds Deposits (t-1) -0.142 * -0.141 *
Other External & Domestic Variables
Forward ir  - mpr -0.043





Observations 795 795 795 795
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ][  4  ]
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The estimates considering monetary operations are presented in the block 
named “Central Bank’s Open Market Operations” in Cols. [2] to [4]. Both 
contemporaneous and lagged discretionary injections and drainages have the 
expected signs and similar magnitudes. The difference between injections and 
drainages lies in the timing of impact. While injections are statistically 
significant contemporaneously, drainages reach significance one period lagged 
(both coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level).
21 The 
estimated coefficients for these variables are robust along all the specifications 
and, more importantly, they are economically significant. However, the size of 
the average drainages and injection operations are quite different -$ 600 and $ 
300 billion, respectively (Table 2). Therefore, in practice, when the central bank 
had operated through repos, the impact on the ir has been two times higher in 
draining than injecting liquidity.  In effect, if we employ the average (median) 
size of each type of operation, the expected effect of drainages and injections on 
the ir is 3.4 (3.1) and 1.7 (1.4) bps, respectively. These results suggest that 
taking the ir to the mpr by the Central Bank is equally effective when the 
market has liquidity shortage with respect to liquidity abundance in the 
interbank system, but the average intervention implies that drainages are 
economically more significant than liquidity injections. 
Regarding permanent monetary operations, we obtain a positive 
contemporaneous effect, and a negative lagged effect of similar magnitude that 
offset the initial positive effect on the ir. In fact, it is not possible to reject the 
null hypothesis that the sum of both coefficients is statistically equal to zero at 
usual confidence intervals. In other words, the estimates imply that “changes” 
in the volume of the operations through permanent facilities do no affect 
permanently the ir. However, this does not imply that existence of this 
mechanism does not affect the dynamics of the ir. The reason behind this 
clarification is that this instrument is available every day and, therefore, the 
market could have internalized its operation in the valuation of the ir and, 
therefore, the use (or not) of this facility is already incorporated in the ir.
22 
Finally, the lagged change in the reserve requirement—which is proportional to 
                                                 
21 Hereafter we will refer to discretional injections and draining simply as “injections” and “draining”. 
22 To test formally if the existence of this mechanism affects the dynamics of the ir, we should have data covering a 
period without the operation of the permanent facilities, which is not available. However, such analysis goes beyond the 
purpose of this paper.   16 
the capital of each bank—is strongly significant, suggesting that higher reserve 
requirements reduce the liquidity of the banks and, therefore, increase the ir. 
In Cols. [3] and [4] we test the relevance of private deposit variables which 
supposedly provide liquidity to the banking system. We test the effect of 
deposits by splitting overall deposits into three categories: deposits by PF with 
duration of up to 90 days (short-run deposits), deposits by PF with duration 
longer than 90 days (long-run deposits) and deposits by other private investors. 
The only statistically significant variables are the lagged short- and long-run PF 
deposits.
23 In order to evaluate the economic significance of long-run PF 
deposits, we employ the average daily change of short- long-run PF deposits — 
-$0.53 and $4.15 billion respectively—, leading to a potential effect on the ir 
reaching -0.006 and 0.05 bps. This magnitude is quite low. However, the 
potential effects of PF deposits could be quite important. In fact, if PF liquidate 
25% of their short- and long-run deposits, the ir could go up by 30 bps (5.6 and 
24.3 bps respectively).
24 
The final variables set we consider consists of mpr surprises (proxied by the 
forward  ir – mpr  spread) and two variables that capture the external 
environment: the Libor-OIS spread and the VIX. Neither of these variables 
prove to be statistical significant. 
In sum, we have two sets of candidates that correlate significantly with 
changes of the ir: standard calendar effects and central bank’s open market 
operations. In order to asses the relative statistical significance of those 
variables, in Table 5 we test the null hypothesis that all the regressors within a 
given variable set are non-significant for each specification. Results in the first 
row of Table 5 show lagged levels and differences of ir and mpr being strongly 
significant at the 1% level. Similarly, results in rows two and three confirm both 
calendar effects and central bank’s operations being statistical significant at the 
1% level. Rows four and five reveal that private investors deposit variables and 
other external and domestic variables are both non-significant at standard 
confidence levels. We also compute three additional measures for the fit of each 
regression: the Akaike and the Bayesian Information Criterions (AIC and BIC, 
                                                 
23 We also consider deposits by private investors’ variables overall deposits and overall PF deposits (both short- and 
long-run). The results are qualitatively similar and are therefore not reported. 
24 Notice that this estimation assumes perfect linearity -constant coefficient-, which could be a conservative assumption 
for this type of estimation.   17 
respectively), and the regression’s adjusted R-Squared. AIC suggests that the 
model including including monetary operations and private investors deposits as 
preferred to specification 1 and 2, while BIC points to a specification only the 
calendar effects better adjusts the data (specification 1). On the contrary, 
specifications including other external variables (specifications 3 and 4, 
respectively) are never preferred by AIC or BIC to the more parsimonious 
specifications 1 and 2. Finally, the last row in Table 5 confirms that the 
inclusion of monetary operations into the model improves the adjusted R-
Squared from 0.30 to 0.34, while the inclusion of further variables is unable to 




Dependent Variable:  t ir Δ  
May 2005 – Aug 2008 
 
Lagged Levels and Differences of ir  and mpr 105.97 *** 67.22 *** 68.02 *** 61.43 ***
Calendar Effects 19.41 *** 19.59 *** 16.67 *** 16.98 ***
Central Bank's Open Market Operations 70.32 *** 73.34 *** 70.38 ***
Private Investors Depositors 5.21 5.31
Other External & Domestic Variables 1.59
Observations 795 795 795 795
Akaike Information Criterion -2041.7 -2066.4 -2074.4 -2047.1
Bayesian Information Criterion -1999.6 -1986.8 -1966.8 -1911.4
R-squared 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.34
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ][  4  ]
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
3.1.2.  Asymmetric Effects 
In this subsection we explore whether our estimates are sensitive to 
aggregate market liquidity, i.e. to positive and negative values of the ir - mpr 
spread. For such a purpose, we consider the specification excluding other 
domestic and external variables (Col. [3], Table 4).
25 Operationally, we estimate 
a regression in which the speed of convergence, the contemporaneous and lagged 
changes in the ir and in the mpr, discretional monetary operations and deposits 
                                                 
25 The results are robust to different specifications of the ir dynamics.   18 
variables are interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
spread is positive and 0 otherwise. In order to determine whether the 
coefficients are statistically different in both cases, we compute Wald tests. 
Table 6 presents the coefficients for negative and positive spreads in Cols. [1] 
and [2] respectively, while Col. [3] shows the statistics of the Wald test under 
the null hypothesis of non-asymmetric coefficients –i.e., that the coefficients are 
not statistically different. The results reveal asymmetric effects on just some of 
the variables. The first source of asymmetry emerges from the lagged ir – mpr 
spread, which is significantly higher when the market is illiquid than with a 
liquid market (0.46 vs. 0.32). Secondly, results reveal the change in mpr being 
also asymmetric. In fact, when the spread is positive, changes in the mpr are 
translated into a one-to-one basis to the ir, but the pass-through is significantly 
lower if the spread is negative (less than one-fifth). Finally, we also find some 
evidence of asymmetries in mandatory reserves.  
Table 6 
Testing Asymmetric Coefficients 
ir  (t-1) 0.462 *** 0.324 *** [2.31]
mpr  (t-1) -0.455 *** -0.329 *** [2.80] *
Δ mpr 1.050 *** 0.130 [19.89] ***
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.086 -0.067 [0.07]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.488 *** 0.198 [1.43]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.041 *** -0.070 ** [0.66]
Δ Injections (t-1) -0.017 -0.068 [1.18]
Δ Draining -0.024 0.015 [2.00]
Δ Draining (t-1) -0.006 -0.049 [3.25] *
Δ Mandatory Bank Reserve Position 0.027 -0.050 [5.48] **
Δ Mandatory Bank Reserve Position (t-1) 0.067 ** -0.023 [8.52] ***
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Other Investors' Deposits -0.025 -0.078 [1.93]
Δ Other Investors' Deposits (t-1) -0.022 0.017 [0.76]
Δ Short-Run PF Deposits 0.118 0.175 [0.35]
Δ Short-Run PF Deposits (t-1) -0.151 ** 0.026 [0.09]
Δ Long- Run PF Deposits 0.000 0.068 [0.18]
Δ Long- Run PF Deposits (t-1) 0.061 0.023 [1.00]
Observations
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
[ 1 ][  2  ]
ir  > mpr ir  < mpr
[ 3 ]
Illiquid Market Liquid Market Chi2
680
 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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3.1.3 Disentangling the Determinants of the ir: August 2007 
In this section, based on the fourth specification in Table 4 (Col. [4]), we 
decompose the incidence of each one of the considered variables in the dynamics 
of the ir at the end of August 2007. This exercise is relevant because during this 
period the ir was systematically above the mpr—averaging 10.5 bps between 
August 10
th and September 12
th, with a peak of 21 bps—(Figure 1) and, 
additionally, it is not clear what were the main drivers behind this dynamic, i.e., 
PF deposits, international turmoil, expectations on the next monetary policy 
meeting, etc. 
  Figure 3 presents the performance of the model in terms of explaining the 
ir (panel a) and, complementary, the contribution to the ir dynamics of the 
different explanatory variables (panel b). In general terms, the model has a 
relatively good performance at the beginning of August—recall that the model 
has a daily frequency—but it does a poor job between the end of August and 
the monetary policy meeting of September 13
th. In particular, during the second 
week of September, the explanatory variables are able to explain just a minor 
part of the ir decoupling. In some sense, this behavior is consistent with the mix 
of uncertainty associated with the response of monetary policy to both 
inflationary pressures from the international financial turbulences that were 
affecting the economy at that moment. 
With respect to the explained ir dynamics—and particularly at the 
beginning of August— it is interesting to note that the calendar effects and 
monetary operations have an active role in the behavior of the ir.  The variance 
decomposition indicates that the calendar effects, open market operations, 
private deposits and other controls account for 40, 56, 4 and 1% of the 
explained variance during the period under study, respectively. Moreover, the 
maximum contribution of the open market operations in the August-September 
episode is 11.1 bps when the difference between ir and mpr is close to 18 bps –
the fifth of September. As for PF, their role is restricted to just a couple of days 
in mid-August that correspond to the loosening of the restrictions on PF to hold 
foreign assets.
26 In fact, the estimations indicate that the maximum PF 
contribution to the ir occurred in the August episode, accounting for 2.9 bps of 
the gap between the ir and the mpr in the period. This point contrasts with 
                                                 
26 The limit to holding foreign assets was increased from 30% to 35% of total portfolio on August, 9
th, 2007.   20 
several opinions by market operators during those days regarding the impact on 
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3.2.  Panel Data Analysis 
This section presents panel data estimates with the purpose of exploring 
whether bank level differences could be relevant for explaining the dynamics of 
the ir. Due to data availability, the sample period covers a shorter period than 
in the previous section (from June 2006 to August 2008). The empirical model 
estimated in this section is similar to the model used in the time series section. 
In fact, we estimate a panel error correction model with IV to control for 





01 1 , −− Δ= − + +++ it it t i t i t it ir ir mpr X α δυ η ε     ( 2 )  
 
where the dependent variable is defined as the change in the interbank asking 
rate defined in section 2.1, and where υι and ητ correspond to fixed and time 
effects, respectively,
29 while the index i denotes each of the 29 banks in our 
sample. Vector X contains the same controls used for time series estimations 
with the only difference that they are disaggregated at the bank level. In 
general, the notation for the other variables remains the same as before. 
                                                 
27 See section 2. 
28 A quite similar econometric approach is performed by Cocco et al. (2009) 
29 We consider time effect with a weekly frequency. The reason behind this decision lies in the fact that the time 
dimension (539) of our dataset is significantly higher than the number of individuals (29).   21 
Similarly to time series estimations, we apply the Hausman (1978) test to 
each covariate. The test supports the statistical exogeneity assumption for all 
the variables except for net permanent facilities. For this variable, we consider 
as external instruments the contemporaneous and lagged values of derivative 
contracts. The logic behind the use of derivatives as instruments is that they 
reduce the availability of banks to lend and borrow in the interbank market 
because they employ part of pre-determined credit lines between banks to 
operate between them, but the use of derivatives is not directly related to the ir 
dynamics. Therefore, the use of derivatives is related to the endogenous 
explanatory variable and, simultaneously, not to the error term. 
 
3.2.1.  Baseline Estimations 
  Table 7 presents the benchmark regressions. The main difference with 
respect to time series estimations is the magnitude of the coefficients, which 
tend to be higher in the panel dimension. Concretely, the speed of convergence 
of the ir of each bank to the mpr is practically twice the speed at the 
aggregated level, roughly 0.50 (Table 7) versus 0.29 (Table 4). On the other 
hand, and perhaps more interestingly, the contemporaneous effect of injections 
fluctuates around 0.58, while in the time series estimates are close to 0.05 
(however, this coefficient has low statistical significance).  
Similarly, the magnitude of the drainage effect is 10 times the effect 
estimated in the time series: 0.7 in panel estimations while in the time series it 
is approximately 0.06. A similar situation occurs with the estimated effect of 
injections, which is approximately three times higher than the estimated effect 
in the time series dimension. With respect to calendar effects, they have similar 
magnitudes compared to the time series estimates. The only difference is the 
estimated effect for the monetary policy meeting dummy variable, which turns 
out to be negative and significant, and the value-added payoff day dummy, 
which turns out to be non-significant. The set of calendar effects also include a 
dummy that takes the value one for those banks that are net lenders in each 
trading day. We do this in order to capture the fact that lender banks have 
probably more liquidity at hand and, therefore, should face a lower asking ir. 
Our belief is confirmed by the finding of an ir 0.7 bps lower for those banks. 
The existence of higher impacts at individual than aggregated level 
reflects the high heterogeneity across banks in terms of the use of instruments   22 
and liquidity positions at each moment.
30 In this sense, this result highlights the 
importance of a monetary planning that takes into account the liquidity 
position of each bank in order to maximize the efficiency of its instruments. 
To illustrate the implications of the magnitude of the individual 
elasticities, if the Central Bank reduces liquidity by $ 700 billion through 
liquidity deposits in 9 commercial banks,
31 the ir of the banks using such 
instrument will go up by 5.3 bps. In contrast, time series estimates indicate that 
the aggregated ir will decrease by only 3.7 bps. In contrast, a liquidity injection 
of 300 billion through repo operations in 5.1 commercial banks reduce the ir of 




Panel IV Estimation. Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ  
Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
ir (t-1) - mpr (t-1) -0.542 *** -0.481 *** -0.479 ***
Δ mpr 0.228 *** 0.436 *** 0.437 ***
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.058 *** -0.058 ** -0.059 **
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.161 *** 0.417 *** 0.417 ***
Calendar Effects
MP Meeting day -0.010 * -0.018 *** -0.017 ***
VAT Payoff day -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
Pre- End of Maintenance Period -0.009 *** -0.007 * -0.007 *
Post- End of Maintenance Period 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 ***
Dummy Lender Bank -0.006 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 **
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.184 ** -0.181 **
Δ Injections (t-1) 0.13 0.135
Δ Drainage 0.725 ** 0.702 **
Δ Drainage (t-1) 0.679 0.649
Δ Net Permanent Facilities -0.541 -0.529
Δ Net Permanent Facilities (t-1) 0.151 0.219
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Overall PFs Deposits -0.095
Δ Overall PFs Deposits (t-1) -0.294
Δ Other Deposits 0.005
Δ Other Deposits (t-1) 0.059
Observations 3804 3085 3085
Groups 22 20 20
[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ]
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Estimations include individual and monthly fixed effects.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
30 If banks were not heterogeneous, the aggregate elasticity will collapse to the individual estimates. 
31 The average liquidity deposit implies that 9.5 banks use this facility, each one requesting 73.1 billions pesos. 
32 The average repo operations implies that 5.1 banks use this facility, each one requesting 61.7 billions pesos.   23 
 
3.2.2.  Asymmetric Response 
  In this section we explore whether the asymmetric effects of monetary 
operations and deposits on the ir dynamics found in time series analysis are also 
valid on the ir of individual banks. Table 8 reports the coefficients for these 
variables depending on the sign of the ir – mpr spread of each bank—i.e., liquid 
and illiquid market. The results are similar to the aggregated estimates, but 





Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ  
Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ]
Illiquid Market Liquid Market
ir  > mpr ir  < mpr
ir (t-1) - mpr (t-1) -0.547 *** -0.450 *** [207.4] ***
Δ mpr 0.982 *** 0.074 * [127.1] ***
Δ ir  (t-1) 0.001 -0.106 *** [4.90] **
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.083 0.163 * [4.52] **
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.096 0.000 [0.19]
Δ Injections (t-1) 0.125 -0.119 [0.00]
Δ Drainage 0.088 0.765 *** [2.97] *
Δ Drainage (t-1) 0.065 1.709 *** [4.93] **
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Overall PFs Deposits 0.039 0.400 [0.62]
Δ Overall PFs Deposits (t-1) -0.442 -0.380 [1.55]
Δ Other Deposits 0.067 -0.267 [0.91]
Δ Other Deposits (t-1) 0.120 ** -0.139 [0.01]
Observations
Groups
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimations include 





Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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First, the speed of convergence is statistically higher when the banks are illiquid 
or, equivalently, the banks’ capacity to bring down the ir is higher when its ir is 
above the mpr. Moreover, and in line with time series estimations, the ir 
adjustment to changes in the mpr is statistically higher when the ir is above 
than below the mpr. In some sense, these results can be summarized as a higher 
b a n k  c a p a c i t y  t o  a d j u s t  t o  a n  i l l i q u i d  s t a t u s — i . e . ,  ir>mpr—and/or, 
complementary, the mpr tends to be the relevant marginal rate for illiquid 
banks, which is consistent with an ir higher than mpr, and vice versa. 
Regarding monetary operations, we find that discretionary drainages are 
more effective when the market is liquid. In fact, the magnitude of the sum of 
both contemporaneous and lagged draining coefficients when the market is 
liquid is almost ten times the coefficients when the market is illiquid. On the 
other hand, injections are not statistical significant. The same is true for PFs 
overall deposits, and for the contemporaneous value of depostis by other 
investors. 
 
3.2.3 Large and Medium Banks 
In this subsection we evaluate if the responsiveness of the ir depends on 
the bank’s scale. For such purposes, and following the bank classification 
proposed by Jara and Oda (2007), we run a different regression for the large-, 
medium-, and small-banks. These authors make a cluster analysis for the 
Chilean banking industry, defining each cluster according to the Euclidean 
distance of each bank with respect to others which is dependent of a set of 
characteristics.
33 
  Results in Table 8 reveal that large-scale banks are able to adjust faster 
to misalignments of the ir from the mpr. In addition, large-scale banks are less 
responsive to variations of the mpr. These results are consistent with the fact 
that large-sized banks have a bigger quantity of funding sources as well as 
greater assets. On the other extreme, small-scale banks shows the smaller 
coefficient of convergence and are more responsive to changes in the mpr.  
The main result, however, corresponds to the strong asymmetry observed 
in the monetary operations depending on bank type. Open market operations 
are non-significant for large- and medium-scale banks. This finding is consistent 
                                                 
33 Jara and Oda (2007) consider the following characteristics: market share, leverage, degree of portfolio diversification 
and target market.   25 
with a higher degree of autonomy in the funding of this type of banks (see 
section 2.3). On the contrary, small-scale banks are the most responsive 
classification to open market operations. Actually, they are the only group 




Panel IV Estimation by Type of Bank 
Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ  
Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
ir (t-1) - mpr (t-1) -0.649 *** -0.55 *** -0.486 ***
Δ mpr 0.134 0.197 *** 0.299 ***
Δ ir  (t-1) 0.002 -0.047 -0.083 ***
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.185 0.08 0.21 **
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.025 -0.163 -0.266 *
Δ Injections (t-1) 0.074 0.139 0.212 *
Δ Drainage 0.294 0.687 1.36 ***
Δ Drainage (t-1) -0.439 0.239 0.986
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Overall PFs Deposits -0.224 0.338 0.932
Δ Overall PFs Deposits (t-1) -0.347 -0.233 -0.189
Δ Other Deposits -0.053 0.042 0.173
Δ Other Deposits (t-1) 0.049 0.012 0.047
Observations
Groups
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimations include 
individual and monthly fixed effects. The equations include the same controls used in the time series IV estimation
497
Large Banks Medium Banks Small Banks
[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ]
497 1650 1395
 
Source: Authors` calculations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we make use of three detailed micro-datasets to understand 
the determinants of the dynamics of the ir in Chile, which allows us to evaluate 
in detail the role of open market operations and private deposits. Regarding 
monetary policy, we consider discretionary operations that provide liquidity 
(repos) and those that reduce it (liquidity deposits), and non-discretionary   26 
instruments (permanent credit facilities). Also, the estimations control for 
calendar effects, which are quite relevant in explaining the dynamics of the ir. 
In general terms, the main findings show the effectiveness of open market 
operations in terms to get the ir closer to the mpr. This is especially valid to 
discretionary operations. In fact, the point estimates of the coefficients related 
to drainages and injections are statistically and economically significant. Indeed, 
the average draining operation increases the ir approximately 3.4 bps, while the 
opposite operation reduces the ir around 1.7 bps. The asymmetries detected 
suggest that such effectiveness depends on the liquidity status at market level. 
Specifically, open market operations seem to be more effective when the market 
is illiquid –i.e., ir>mpr. Moreover, in this line of results, the estimates suggest 
that the pass trough from mpr to ir is close to 1 when the ir is above the mpr.  
Conversely, if the ir is below the mpr, the coefficient of pass trough is near to 
0.15. 
  The role of asymmetries of monetary operations is reinforced by the panel 
estimates. In general, the panel’s point estimates of open market operations are 
significant higher than the time series estimates –for instance, the magnitude of 
the drainage effect is also 10 times the effect estimated in the time series– which 
indicates that the effectiveness and access to central bank’s instruments is quite 
heterogeneous across banks. The estimates by category of bank -large and 
medium- show that part of this heterogeneity is captured trough this 
classification, where the open market operations are less relevant to large banks 
(the more liquid ones), and more relevant for small-sized banks. 
  The results on PF deposits indicate that they are statistically significant 
with a relative high coefficient –specially, long-run deposits- but if we consider 
the behavior of this variable during the sample period, their economic relevance 
is limited. In fact, the statistical tests oriented to evaluate the relevance of 
potential explanatory variables suggest that bank’s deposits do not significantly 
help to improve the econometric specifications of the ir. Traditional information 
criteria statistics tilt towards a specification based on calendar effects and open 
market operations as controls. Nonetheless, from a financial stability 
perspective, the PF deposits could be quite relevant on the dynamics of the ir, 
because PF accounts for approximately 20% of total bank deposits. In other 
words, even though the PF’s deposits did not play an important role on the 
dynamics of the ir during the sample period, if these investors rebalance their   27 
portfolios abruptly against banks’ deposits, the effects on the interbank market 
could have a systemic impact. 
  Finally, the calendar effects are both statistical and economic significant. 
For instance, the day of payment of the value-added-tax is associated with an 
increase of the ir equal to 2 bps. This kind of result is relatively standard in the 
literature, and even though market practitioners could be habituated to them, 
they are puzzling. On one hand, these calendar effects are totally predictable -
for instance, they are not doubts about when the taxes are paid- and, if we 
assume perfect markets, the ir should internalize such effects on its pricing. This 
line of reasoning opens important questions about the frictions that could be 
behind the calendar effects’ incidence. 
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Appendix 1: Managing the ir in Chile 
 
The Central Bank applies its monetary policy through the definition of a 
target level for the interbank rate (ir) known as the monetary policy rate (mpr). 
To ensure that the ir remains close to the mpr, the Central Bank must regulate 
the financial system’s liquidity (or reserves) through the use of several 
instruments: open market transactions, buying and selling of short-term 
promissory notes, lines of credit and liquidity deposits. 
Open market transactions are essentially carried out through regular 
auctions of promissory notes issued by the Central Bank: short-term nominal 
discount promissory notes (PDBC), and nominal and indexed promissory notes 
(BCP and BCU). Banks, financial institutions administering PF, insurance 
companies and mutual funds can participate in these tenders’ auctions. The 
bidding of promissory notes is carried out using the single price per auction 
method, that is, a cut-off rate is applied to all participants in the auction 
placing winning bids, in what is known as the “Dutch method”. This encourages 
competition among auction participants and tends to reflect current market 
conditions more accurately. 
In the case of the (average) ir deviates from the policy rate due, for 
instance as a result of liquidity levels below demand from the banking system, 
liquidity is injected to lower the ir rate and bring it closer to the mpr. This 
liquidity injection is generally achieved by overnight purchases of notes with 
repurchase clauses (repos). When the opposite occurs, and there is excess 
liquidity and the ir tends to be below the mpr, the excess is withdrawn by 
selling short term promissory notes. 
Additionally, starting on January 2005, the Central Bank implemented 
permanent credit (deposit) facilities which are intended to avoid the ir surpasses   30 
(be below) the mpr by more (less) than 25 basis points. In this context, the 
implementation of open market operations followed common practices of 
developed economies’ central banks (US, Canada, Europe, among many others).  
The Central Bank uses permanent liquidity credit lines to provide 
financial institutions with overnight loans. This account requires collateral, 
instruments authorized in the Compendium of Financial Norms. It does not 
have quantitative limits, except for the availability of collateral of the applicant. 
Currently, the received interest rate is set at 25 basis points above the mpr. 
Similarly, permanent liquidity deposits allow financial institutions to 
deposit temporary excess liquidity overnight with the Central Bank and receive 
a minimum return. Currently, this rate is set at 25 basis points below the mpr 
and in practice this constitutes the floor of the ir. 
In order to regulate adequately financial system liquidity, the Central 
Bank develops a cash flow program around the reserve requirement time period, 
that is, from day nine of each month though day eight of the following month. 
To encourage less volatility in the banks’ reserve requirement compliance and 
thus the ir, there is also an intermediate reserve requirement on day 23 of each 
month, the deadline by which the banks must have complied with at least 90% 
of the required reserve. 
To program cash flow, projections are made for both supply and demand 
of bank reserves that is bills and coins in the power of banks and balances in 
banks’ current accounts in the Central Bank. Demand is of a derived nature 
that basically depends on reserve requirement rates and trends forecast for 
demand and term deposits, along with the behavior of currency in the public’s 
hands. The supply of bank reserves depends on the behavior of currency in the 
public’s hands and from the main sources of emission, particularly the 
maturities of previously auctioned promissory notes and other, more 
autonomous sources of monetary expansion for which projections are required. 
These operations include eventual purchases or sales of dollars within the 
financial system by the Central Bank and State financial operations having 
monetary effects. 
Once the supply and demand for bank reserves have been determined, 
the amount of notes to be tendered by the Central Bank is established. The 
calendar of auctions is published the day before each new reserve period begins. 
The liquidity projection for the next four weeks is monitored daily to permit   31 
fine tuning operations on bank reserves, as needed, using the repo operations 
already mentioned or special sales of short-term promissory notes. Worth to 
mention that the mechanism to provide and dried out liquidity from banks 
described above is quite similar -with particularities in the implementation that 
may be crucial in the modeling strategy- in other economies.  
 
Appendix 2: Unit Root Test 
 
Table A1 





Half-Life Not Defined 345.2 1.3
Augmented Dickey - Fuller -0.314 -0.409 -4.733 ***
Phillips - Perron (Zt) -0.379 -0.863 -11.306 ***
DF - GLS 1.675 0.31 -3.993 ***
KPSS 7.95 *** 8.15 *** 0.884 ***
Note: Except for KPSS, all the tests have as null hypothesis the non-stationarity of the series. *  significant at 
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Appendix 3: OLS Estimation (Baseline Time-Series Model) 
Table A2 
OLS Estimations 
Dependent Variable:  t ir Δ  
May 2005 – Aug 2008 
ir  (t-1) -0.343 *** -0.285 *** -0.281 *** -0.272 ***
[0.040] [0.044] [0.044] [0.040]
mpr  (t-1) 0.343 *** 0.285 *** 0.281 *** 0.271 **
[0.041] [0.045] [0.044] [0.040]
Δ mpr 0.217 ** 0.158 0.154 0.134
[0.099] [0.107] [0.109] [0.115]
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.094 *** -0.066 * -0.065 * -0.084 *
[0.035] [0.037] [0.037] [0.036]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.232 * 0.268 * 0.277 * 0.233
[0.129] [0.142] [0.146] [0.149]
Calendar Effects
MP Meeting day 0.021 0.031 ** 0.032 ** 0.033 **
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
VAT Payoff day 0.025 ** 0.025 ** 0.023 ** 0.021 *
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012]
Pre- End of Maintenance Period -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Post- End of Maintenance Period 0.027 *** 0.015 * 0.012 0.013
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.054 *** -0.058 *** -0.057 ***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Δ Injections (t-1) -0.005 -0.010 -0.011
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Δ Draining 0.017 0.014 0.013
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Δ Draininng (t-1) 0.006 0.006 0.005
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012]
Δ Mandatory Reserve Requirement 0.014 0.017 0.018
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
Δ Mandatory Reserve Requirement (t-1) 0.063 *** 0.067 *** 0.067 ***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Δ Net Permanent Facilities 0.110 *** 0.112 *** 0.113 ***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.017]
Δ Net Permanent Facilities ( t - 1 ) 0 . 0 3 3 *0 . 0 3 3 *0 . 0 3 6 * *
[0.018] [0.018] [0.017]
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ][  4  ]
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Table A2 (cont.) 
OLS Estimations 
Dependent Variable:  t ir Δ  
May 2005 – Aug 2008 
 
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Other Investors' Deposits -0.018 -0.014
[0.019] [0.019]
Δ Other Investors' Deposits (t-1) -0.007 -0.005
[0.015] [0.015]
Δ Short-Run Pension Funds Deposits 0.089 0.084
[0.067] [0.067]
Δ Short-Run Pension Funds Deposits (t-1) -0.051 -0.057
[0.051] [0.051]
Δ Long-Run Pension Funds Deposits 0.107 0.109
[0.081] [0.080]
Δ Long-Run Pension Funds Deposits (t-1) -0.125 ** -0.119 *
[0.062] [0.062]
Other External & Domestic Variables
Forward ir  - mpr -0.016
[0.052]










Observations 804 804 804 804
Akaike Information Criterion -2068.3 -2184.6 -2181.6 -2178.5
Bayesian Information Criterion -2021.4 -2100.2 -2069.1 -2037.8
R-squared 0.3 0.41 0.42 0.42
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ][  4  ]
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Appendix 4: Full Tables 
Table A3 (Extended Table 4) 
IV Estimations; Dependent Variable:  t ir Δ  
Sample Period: May 2005 – Aug 2008 
 
ir  (t-1) -0.342 *** -0.299 *** -0.295 *** -0.286 ***
[0.041] [0.045] [0.043] [0.042]
mpr  (t-1) 0.343 *** 0.299 *** 0.295 *** 0.286 ***
[0.041] [0.045] [0.043] [0.043]
Δ mpr 0.215 ** 0.179 0.175 0.142
[0.099] [0.109] [0.109] [0.116]
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.092 *** 0.032 0.026 0.031
[0.035] [0.065] [0.067] [0.069]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.230 * 0.251 ** 0.261 ** 0.223 *
[0.129] [0.119] [0.123] [0.127]
Calendar Effects
MP Meeting day 0.021 0.03 ** 0.032 ** 0.034 **
[0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
VAT Payoff day 0.026 ** 0.02 * 0.018 0.015
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
Pre- End of Maintenance Period -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Post- End of Maintenance Period 0.028 *** 0.03 *** 0.027 ** 0.028 **
[0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.057 *** -0.061 *** -0.062 ***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Δ Injections (t-1) -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Δ Draining 0.014 0.011 0.007
[0.030] [0.031] [0.031]
Δ Draininng (t-1) 0.056 ** 0.054 ** 0.059 **
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Δ Mandatory Reserve Requirement 0.011 0.015 0.011
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029]
Δ Mandatory Reserve Requirement (t-1) 0.111 ** 0.112 *** 0.116 ***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Δ Net Permanent Facilities 0.102 * 0.103 * 0.111 **
[0.058] [0.057] [0.056]
Δ Net Permanent Facilities (t-1) -0.091 -0.083 -0.095
[0.055] [0.057] [0.058]
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ][  4  ]
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Table A3 (cont.) 
IV Estimations; Dependent Variable:  t ir Δ  
Sample Period: May 2005 – Aug 2008 
 
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Other Investors' Deposits -0.008 -0.004
[0.020] [0.020]
Δ Other Investors' Deposits (t-1) -0.006 -0.004
[0.017] [0.017]
Δ Short-Run Pension Funds Deposits 0.091 0.093
[0.078] [0.078]
Δ Short-Run Pension Funds Deposits (t-1) -0.112 * -0.123 *
[0.068] [0.069]
Δ Long-Run Pension Funds Deposits 0.110 0.118
[0.088] [0.089]
Δ Long-Run Pension Funds Deposits (t-1) -0.142 * -0.141 *
[0.079] [0.080]
Other External & Domestic Variables
Forward ir  - mpr -0.043
[0.048]










Observations 795 795 795 795
Akaike Information Criterion -2037.7 -2069.4 -2062.9 -2055.6
Bayesian Information Criterion -1991.0 -1985.4 -1950.9 -1915.6
R-squared 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.37
Note: Robust standard error in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ]
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Table A4 (Extended Table 6) 
Testing Asymmetric Coefficients 
Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ ; Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
ir  (t-1) 0.462 *** 0.324 *** [2.31]
[0.074] [0.063]***
mpr  (t-1) -0.455 *** -0.329 *** [2.80] *
[0.073] [0.064]***
Δ mpr 1.050 *** 0.130 [19.89] ***
[0.191] [0.093]
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.086 -0.067 [0.07]
[0.075] [0.083]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.488 *** 0.198 [1.43]
[0.142] [0.191]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.041 *** -0.070 ** [0.66]
[0.014] [0.035]**
Δ Injections (t-1) -0.017 -0.068 [1.18]
[0.015] [0.048]
Δ Draining -0.024 0.015 [2.00]
[0.028] [0.031]
Δ Draining (t-1) -0.006 -0.049 [3.25] *
[0.026] [0.032]
Δ Mandatory Bank Reserve Position 0.027 -0.050 [5.48] **
[0.028] [0.034]
Δ Mandatory Bank Reserve Position (t-1) 0.067 ** -0.023 [8.52] ***
[0.028] [0.035]
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Other Investors' Deposits -0.025 -0.078 [1.93]
[0.019] [0.034]**
Δ Other Investors' Deposits (t-1) -0.022 0.017 [0.76]
[0.017] [0.042]
Δ Short-Run PF Deposits 0.118 0.175 [0.35]
[0.078] [0.106]
Δ Short-Run PF Deposits (t-1) -0.151 ** 0.026 [0.09]
[0.068] [0.148]
Δ Long- Run PF Deposits 0.000 0.068 [0.18]
[0.068] [0.102]
Δ Long- Run PF Deposits (t-1) 0.061 0.023 [1.00]
[0.065] [0.119]
Observations
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ir  > mpr ir  < mpr
680
Chi2
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ]
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Table A5 (Extended Table 7) 
Panel IV Estimation, Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ  
Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
ir (t-1) - mpr (t-1) -0.542 *** -0.481 *** -0.479 ***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Δ mpr 0.228 *** 0.436 *** 0.437 ***
[0.041] [0.069] [0.069]
Δ ir  (t-1) -0.058 *** -0.058 ** -0.059 **
[0.016] [0.027] [0.027]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.161 *** 0.417 *** 0.417 ***
[0.060] [0.056] [0.056]
Calendar Effects
MP Meeting day -0.010 * -0.018 *** -0.017 ***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
VAT Payoff day -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Pre- End of Maintenance Period -0.009 *** -0.007 * -0.007 *
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Post- End of Maintenance Period 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 ***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Dummy Lender Bank -0.006 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 **
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.184 ** -0.181 **
[0.084] [0.086]
Δ Injections (t-1) 0.13 0.135
[0.086] [0.086]
Δ Drainage 0.725 ** 0.702 **
[0.319] [0.328]
Δ Drainage (t-1) 0.679 0.649
[0.501] [0.499]
Δ Net Permanent Facilities -0.541 -0.529
[0.627] [0.630]
Δ Net Permanent Facilities (t-1) 0.151 0.219
[0.915] [0.915]
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Overall PFs Deposits -0.095
[0.219]
Δ Overall PFs Deposits (t-1) -0.294
[0.301]
Δ Other Deposits 0.005
[0.045]
Δ Other Deposits (t-1) 0.059
[0.044]
Observations 3804 3085 3085
Groups 22 20 20
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Estimations include individual and monthly fixed effects.
[ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 1 ]
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Table A6 (Extended Table 8) 
Testing Asymmetry; Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ  
Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
 
[ 1 ][  2  ][  3  ]
Illiquid Market Liquid Market
ir  > mpr ir  < mpr
ir (t-1) - mpr (t-1) -0.547 *** -0.450 *** [207.4] ***
[0.035] [0.060]
Δ mpr 0.982 *** 0.074 * [127.1] ***
[0.086] [0.038]
Δ ir  (t-1) 0.001 -0.106 *** [4.90] **
[0.030] [0.041]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.083 0.163 * [4.52] **
[0.083] [0.098]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.096 0.000 [0.19]
[0.136] [0.139]
Δ Injections (t-1) 0.125 -0.119 [0.00]
[0.098] [0.179]
Δ Drainage 0.088 0.765 *** [2.97] *
[0.417] [0.283]
Δ Drainage (t-1) 0.065 1.709 *** [4.93] **
[0.521] [0.569]
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Overall PFs Deposits 0.039 0.400 [0.62]
[0.241] [0.440]
Δ Overall PFs Deposits (t-1) -0.442 -0.380 [1.55]
[0.394] [0.354]
Δ Other Deposits 0.067 -0.267 [0.91]
[0.047] [0.188]




Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimations include 
individual and monthly fixed effects. The equations include the same controls used in the time series IV estimation
3059
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Table A7 (Extended Table 9) 
Panel IV Estimation by Type of Bank; Dependent Variable:  it ir Δ ;  
Sample Period: June 2006 to August 2008 
 
ir (t-1) - mpr (t-1) -0.649 *** -0.55 *** -0.486 ***
[0.080] [0.034] [0.038]
Δ mpr 0.134 0.197 *** 0.299 ***
[0.110] [0.060] [0.085]
Δ ir  (t-1) 0.002 -0.047 -0.083 ***
[0.104] [0.034] [0.031]
Δ mpr  (t-1) 0.185 0.08 0.21 **
[0.241] [0.098] [0.103]
Central Bank's Open Market Operations
Δ Injections -0.025 -0.163 -0.266 *
[0.182] [0.178] [0.150]
Δ Injections (t-1) 0.074 0.139 0.212 *
[0.132] [0.128] [0.119]
Δ Drainage 0.294 0.687 1.36 ***
[0.287] [0.445] [0.378]
Δ Drainage (t-1) -0.439 0.239 0.986
[1.129] [0.368] [0.935]
Private Investors Depositors
Δ Overall PFs Deposits -0.224 0.338 0.932
[0.543] [0.238] [1.099]
Δ Overall PFs Deposits (t-1) -0.347 -0.233 -0.189
[0.685] [0.214] [1.120]
Δ Other Deposits -0.053 0.042 0.173
[0.110] [0.053] [0.156]




Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimations include 
individual and monthly fixed effects. The equations include the same controls used in the time series IV estimation
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